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There has been a notable debate in the banking  literature on the impact of bank 
competition on financial stability. While the dominant view sees a detrimental impact of 
competition on the stability of banks, this view has recently been challenged by Boyd and 
De Nicolo (2005) who see the reverse effect. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this 
literature by providing the first empirical investigation of the role of bank competition on 
the occurrence of bank failures. We analyze this issue based on a large sample of Russian 
banks over the period 2001-2007 and in line with the previous literature we employ the 
Lerner index as the metric of bank competition. Our findings clearly support the view 
that tighter bank competition enhances the occurrence of bank failures. The normative 
implication of our findings is  therefore  that measures that  increase  bank competition 
could undermine financial stability. 
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I. Introduction 
The impact of competition on bank failures is a fundamental issue for 
policymakers,  especially  in light of  the current worldwide  penchant for banking 
consolidation. A tendency of competition to have a detrimental effect on the stability of 
banks would lead one to favor the limiting competition in the banking markets over 
blindly pushing for enhanced competition. 
This question has provoked a wide debate in the banking literature. Indeed, while 
gains  from  competition are obvious in most industries, the banking industry, being 
different, might be subject to a negative impact from competition. The long-standing 
dominant view in the literature has been that of a detrimental impact of competition on 
the stability of banks. It is based on the impact of competition on bank profits, which 
reduces the “buffer” against adverse shocks, and on the fact that lower bank profits 
contribute to increasing incentives for bank owners and managers to take excessive risk 
(Keeley, 1990). This view has however been recently challenged by Boyd and De Nicolo 
(2005). Their model shows a beneficial impact of bank competition on financial stability, 
based on the effect of competition on a borrower’s behavior. By reducing loan rates, bank 
competition makes it easier to repay loans, which reduces the moral-hazard behavior of 
borrowers, i.e. the shifting into riskier projects. This in turn reduces the default risk. 
The relation between competition and bank failures has  also  been widely 
investigated in studies on the impact of bank competition on financial stability (Beck, 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine, 2006; Jimenez, Lopez and Saurina, 2008; Berger, Klapper 
and Turk-Ariss, 2009; Boyd, De Nicolo and Jalal, 2006). However,  looking at the 
empirical literature, one is struck by two shortfalls: no clear finding on the impact of bank 
competition on financial stability and,  more  interestingly,  no paper  that  provides  a 
microeconomic investigation of the role of bank competition on bank failures. All the 
papers analyze financial stability using  either  macroeconomic variables such as 
occurrences of banking crises or microeconomic variables other than bank failures (e.g. 
risk-taking measures). Therefore, these papers do not provide empirical tests  of  the 
findings of the theoretical literature on the impact of competition on bank failures. 
Our aim here is to investigate the impact of bank competition on the presence of 
bank failures in Russia in 2001-2007. The Russian banking industry presents a unique   3 
opportunity to test the role of competition on bank failures; nearly 300 Russian banks 
were liquidated or vanished during this period. Moreover, Russia  is an  interesting 
example of an emerging market which has in recent years experienced impressive 
economic and banking-sector growth. The ratio of banking sector assets to GDP has 
doubled since the year 2000 and the same holds true for the ratio of bank credit to the 
private sector to GDP. 
We utilize a rich panel dataset obtained  from the financial information agency 
Interfax and the Central Bank of Russia. The major advantage over the panels used in 
previous studies is that our dataset covers the whole banking sector and thus, unlike the 
Bankscope dataset, it is not subject to the selection bias. Furthermore, we use quarterly 
data,  which allows us to track even more precisely the failures and preceding  bank 
situations. 
This study therefore provides a major contribution to the literature on bank failures, 
being the first empirical study investigating the impact of competition on bank failures. In 
line with recent studies on bank competition (Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos and Perez, 
2005, Solis and Maudos, 2008, Carbo et al., 2009), we measure competition by the 
Lerner index. Following earlier works on the determinants of bank failures in Russia 
(Lanine and Vander Vennet, 2006, Claeys and Schoors, 2007), we adopt the logit model. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
the impact of competition on bank failures. Section 3 presents the recent history of the 
Russian banking industry. Section 4 discusses data and methodology. Section 5 presents 
the results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
II. Literature review 
II.1 Theoretical literature 
As recently summarized by Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009), there are two 
opposing views on the impact of bank competition on financial stability and hence on the 
risk of bank failure. 
The dominant view in the literature has long been the “competition-fragility” view, 
which assumes that competition favors the risk of bank failure. It has its roots in the   4 
seminal paper of Keeley (1990), according to which greater competition reduces the 
franchise value of a bank and then enhances bank incentives to take risks. This argument 
has been supported by numerous theoretical papers stressing the positive impact of bank 
competition on risk-taking.  Among others, Besanko and Thakor (1993)  show that 
increased competition reduces the informational rents from relationship banking and thus 
strengthens the incentive for risk-taking. Since greater risk-taking increases the risk of 
bank failure, these papers support the view that competition promotes bank failures. 
Matutes and Vives (2000)  investigate the role of banks’  market power on risk 
taking incentives by focusing on the deposit market. They consider a framework with 
limited liability for banks and a social cost of failure. Their main conclusion is for a 
positive impact of competition on the risk of bank failure, depending on the deposit 
insurance scheme. This view is also supported by the intuitive argument according to 
which lower bank profits reduce the “buffer” against adverse shocks. As a consequence, 
enhanced competition increases the fragility of banks. 
It is  however challenged by the “competition-stability” strand of literature 
according to which greater competition could contribute to bank stability. In a nutshell, 
this literature focuses on the impact of bank competition, taking account of moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems.  Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)  note  that  the standard 
argument by which competition is detrimental to bank stability neglects the potential role 
of competition on a borrower’s behavior. Indeed, models supporting the “competition-
fragility” view argue that banks choose the riskiness of their assets and may consequently 
increase or reduce it depending on the degree of competition. In opposition, Boyd and De 
Nicolo argue that borrowers actually choose the riskiness of their investments financed 
by bank loans. As a consequence, the impact of greater competition comes via lower loan 
rates, which reduces borrowers’ incentive to undertake moral hazard behavior by shifting 
into riskier projects. Therefore, greater competition reduces default risk and hence banks’ 
losses. 
Caminal and Matutes (2002) present a model specifically devoted to the connection 
between market power and  bank failures, in which competition influences bank solvency 
via the incentive to invest in technologies that reduce information asymmetries and hence 
moral hazard problems. They find  an ambiguous impact of market power on bank   5 
failures,  resulting from the existence of two countervailing forces. On the one hand, 
market power provides more incentive for banks to monitor. On the other hand, it leads to 
higher loan rates,  which  increases the  moral hazard problems. Consequently  the 
relationship depends on the level of banks’ monitoring costs, which influences the first 
force. 
Finally, Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2008) extend Boyd and De Nicolo’s (2005) 
analysis by assuming imperfect correlation of loan defaults. This hypothesis is based on 
the assumption that tighter competition reduces interest payments from non-defaulting 
loans which provide a buffer for loan losses. As a consequence, the risk-shifting effect 
enunciated by Boyd and De Nicolo must be considered against this margin effect which 
goes in the opposite direction. We then  arrive at a U-shaped relationship between 
competition and the risk of bank failure, such that greater competition enhances the risk 
of bank failure in highly  competitive markets but reduces it in highly  concentrated 
markets. 
In summary, the theoretical literature provides opposing arguments with respect to 
the impact of competition on the risk of bank failures. Whereas theories based on the 
impact of competition on bank incentives for risk-taking  assume  a positive role, the 
research  on  the effects of competition,  taking account of moral hazard  and adverse 
selection problems, suggests a negative impact or at least an ambiguous one. Does the 
empirical literature provide definite support for one view over the other?  
 
II.2 Empirical literature 
There are many empirical studies that investigate bank competition and financial 
stability. They differ in the measurement of competition and in the dimension of financial 
stability.  The studies that provide the most relevant findings on the impact of bank 
competition on the risk of bank failure can be divided into two categories.  
The first one includes the micro-based research investigating the influence of bank 
competition on risk-taking. Jimenez, Lopez and Saurina (2008) have recently analyzed 
the impact of bank competition on banks’ risk-taking in a study of 107 Spanish banks. 
Competition is alternatively measured by concentration and Lerner indices. Risk-taking is 
measured by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. While they find no   6 
significant impact of bank concentration, they do find a negative relationship between the 
Lerner index and bank risk-taking.  
Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009) provide a cross-country investigation of the 
impact of bank competition, alternatively measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
and the Lerner index, on three measures of bank risk-taking (non-performing loans ratio, 
Z-score, and capitalization ratio). The analysis is performed on a sample of 9000 banks 
from 89 developing and developed countries. They find support for a positive impact of 
competition on risk-taking in developed countries  but  obtain  ambiguous  results  for 
developing countries. 
While both of the above mentioned studies confirm a detrimental effect of bank 
competition on bank stability, Boyd, De Nicolo and Jalal (2006) and De Nicolo and 
Loukoianova (2007) arrive at a different conclusion.  They  test the link between the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index and the Z-score, on two different samples, one of 2500 US 
banks and one of 2700 banks, from 134 countries excluding major developed countries. 
These studies confirm a positive impact of bank concentration on bank risk, and therefore 
support the “competition-stability” view in line with Boyd and De Nicolo (2005). 
The second group of studies are macro-based ones that analyze the impact of bank 
competition on financial stability. In this strand of the literature, two papers are closely 
related to ours, as they focus on the impact of bank competition on the occurrence of a 
banking crisis. 
Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2006) investigate  the  impact  of bank 
concentration on the likelihood of a systemic banking crisis. Bank concentration is 
measured by the share of the three largest banks in total banking assets, and banking 
crisis is defined as a situation where the banking system has suffered high losses or where 
emergency measures, such as large-scale nationalizations or deposit freezes, have been 
taken to assist the banking system. The analysis is performed on a sample of 69 countries 
for the period 1980-1997, which includes 47 crisis episodes. The conclusion is that 
banking crises are less likely in more concentrated banking systems. Thus, this paper 
supports the “competition-fragility” view. 
Schaeck, Cihak and Wolfe (2009) extend this work by using another measure of 
bank competition, the non-structural H-Statistic, and by analyzing the impact of bank   7 
competition on the occurrence of a banking crisis and on the run-up time to crisis. The 
investigation is based  on a sample of 45 countries for the period 1980-2005,  which 
includes 31 banking crises. The main finding is that competition reduces the likelihood of 
a banking crisis and increases the run-up time to crisis. Hence, this work supports the 
“competition-stability” view. 
This brief survey of the empirical literature suggests that there is no consensus on 
the impact of bank competition on either risk-taking at the micro level or the occurrence 
of a banking crisis at the macro level. Accordingly, the empirical literature does not 
provide clear evidence that would enable us to discriminate between the “competition-
fragility” and the “competition-stability” views. 
 
 
III. Recent evolution of the Russian banking industry 
 
Following the recovery from severe crises in 1998, the Russian economy started to 
grow by more than six percent annually. Favorable macroeconomic developments and 
institutional reforms spurred rapid growth also in the banking sector. The ratio of total 
banking sector assets has doubled since year 2000 and stood at 67% of GDP in  2008. 
The same holds true for banking credit, which amounted to more than 40 % of GDP in 
2008.  
Banks have begun to perform their role as financial intermediaries. The structure of 
banking activities has changed: the proportion of loans in total sector assets has been 
increasing rapidly, conditions for lending have become more market-based, claims on the 
government have contracted significantly. Banks began to provide many kinds of new 
services, not only to traditional corporate clients but increasingly to households. 
The legal and regulatory environment has improved as well
1
                                                 
1 For a detailed description, see Barisitz (2008).  
. A large number of 
institutional reforms took place, starting with amendments to the major banking laws. 
The most important was the introduction of deposit insurance by the law adopted in 
December 2003. The Deposit Insurance Agency was established in 2004, and by the end 
of March 2005 the first 824 banks that managed to meet the requirements were admitted   8 
to the system in the first wave. Altogether, there were 1150 applicants and by September 
2005, the deadline for joining the system, 927 banks were admitted (Camara & Montes-
Negret, 2006).  
Despite all these developments, the Russian banking system remains small, even in 
comparison to other emerging markets. Its structure has not changed significantly. The 
number of credit institutions remains high, still exceeding 1100. It has however decreased 
from the 1300 that were registered in the year 2000. More than 350 banking licenses were 
revoked by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) in the period between 2000 and 2007. The 
liquidity crisis in 2004 demonstrates that fragility still characterizes the whole sector. 
This crisis was caused by the lack of trust that paralyzed the  interbank market and 
initiated withdrawals of private deposits. This led to an increased number of revoked 
licenses in 2005. Afterwards, in 2006 and 2007, CBR gradually revoked the licenses of 
banks that were outside of the deposit insurance system.  
Even though the number of registered banks is high, the system is still dominated 
by a few large state-controlled banks. The five biggest banks account for about 40 % of 
the sector’s total assets. Moreover, the proportion of state-controlled banks remains quite 
high, in contrast to the other transition countries. These banks account for almost half of 
banking sector assets. The biggest bank is the state-controlled Sberbank. Its share of 
private deposits has decreased from over 70% in 2000, but remains high, at about 50%. 
At the same time, foreign participation in the sector remains modest. The number of 
foreign-owned banks has increased from 130 in 2000 to 202 in the year 2008. Thanks to 
several acquisitions by foreign banks in 2006 and two big IPOs in 2007, the share of 
foreign-owned institutions in banking sector capital increased from 7 to 28 % between 
2000 and 2007. 
 
 
IV. Data and methodology 
IV.1 Data 
We use quarterly bank-level data from the financial information agency Interfax. 
Our sample contains observations from the first quarter of 2001 to the first quarter of 
2007, for data reasons. The list of failed banks is from www.banki.ru. As mentioned   9 
before, the Russian banking industry is composed of a large number of banks, of which 
only a few are state-controlled, but the latter still dominate the market. Owing to this 
specific status and to the fact that the risk of failure does not mean the same thing for 
state-controlled and private banks, we excluded all the state-controlled banks from the 
sample. To ensure that a bank pursues lending activities, we include only banks with 
more than 5% of loans in total assets. Our final sample for estimation consists of over 
20,000 bank quarter observations. 
The focus of our research is to investigate the role of banks’ market power in the 
occurrence of bank failure. The explained variable is a dummy variable which equals one 
for a quarter in which a bank loses its license and zero otherwise. Our definition accords 
with studies on the determinants of bank failures (Lanine and Vander Vennet, 2006, 
Claeys and Schoors, 2007). 
The explanatory variable of primary concern is the Lerner index (Lerner Index), 
which measures market power. Its computation is described in the next subsection. To 
select control variables, we follow the empirical literature on the determinants of bank 
failures (e.g. Arena, 2008), with an additional constraint: unlike earlier papers, we focus 
on the role of bank competition. Therefore, because the theoretical literature suggests that 
the channel of transmission is banks’ risk-taking, we cannot include in the model risk-
taking variables such as  non-performing loans or equity-to-total assets ratios. 
Furthermore, as market power is related to profitability, we cannot consider profitability 
measures like return on assets. 
We however include  five control variables,  in  accord  with  literature on 
determinants of bank failures. Size is measured by the logarithm of total assets (Size), as 
the scale of operations can exert an impact on the probability of bank failure via the “too 
big to fail” argument.  The ratio of loans to total assets (Loans) is included  in the 
estimations, as  it measures the structure of assets.  We also account for the share of 
deposits in total assets (Deposits), as sources of finance can influence the occurrence of 
bank failure through several mechanisms. One can notably consider the possibility of 
bank runs, which is of course related to the importance of deposits in total balance sheet. 
But even if we do not consider this extreme case, several papers have provided evidence 
on depositor discipline in the Russian banking markets (Ungan, Caner and Özyildirim,   10 
2006;  Karas, Pyle, Schoors, 2009).  According to these,  the perception of increasing 
probability of failure could lead to deposit withdrawals. 
Following Lanine and Vander Vennet (2006) and Claeys and Schoors (2007), we 
include the ratio of government bonds to total assets (Government Bonds). Three reasons 
are provided by these authors for considering  this variable as a determinant of bank 
failures in Russia. First, it controls for liquidity, as government bonds can be sold in case 
of a liquidity shortage. An alternative measure of liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to 
total assets;  but we cannot include this variable in our estimations, as it is strongly 
correlated with the ratio of loans to total assets. Second, the government might have more 
incentive to rescue banks with higher  shares  of government bonds. Third, this ratio 
controls for the effects of the severe 1998 crisis, as holding a large share of government 
securities may indicate injuries suffered during a  crisis  in which  the government 
defaulted on its bonds in August 1998. Therefore, the expected sign is ambiguous, as the 
first two factors argue for a negative impact on the probability of bank failure, while the 
latter one plumps for a positive role. 
Finally, we also consider a dummy variable, equal to one if the bank’s head office is 
located in the Moscow area and zero otherwise (Moscow). The inclusion of this variable 
is motivated by the fact that about half of the banks surveyed are located in the Moscow 
region. 
Dummy variables for each quarter and each year are also included in the 
estimations to control for seasonal and yearly effects. Descriptive statistics for all the 
variables are reported separately for failed and non-failed banks in table 1. 
 
IV.2 Lerner index 
Empirical research provides several tools for measuring bank competition. They can 
be divided into the traditional Industrial Organization (IO) and the new empirical IO 
approaches. The traditional IO approach proposes tests of market structure to assess bank 
competition based on the Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) model. The SCP 
hypothesis argues that greater concentration causes less competitive bank behavior and 
leads to higher bank profitability. According to this, competition can be measured by   11 
concentration indices such as the market share of the largest banks, or by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index. These tools were widely applied until the 1990s. 
The new empirical IO approach provides non-structural tests to circumvent the 
problems of competition measures based on the traditional IO approach which infers the 
degree of competition from indirect proxies such as market structure or market shares. In 
contrast, the non-structural measures do not infer the competitive conduct of banks from 
an analysis of market structure, but rather measure banks’ behavior directly. 
Following the new empirical IO approach, we compute the Lerner index to get an 
individual measure of competition for each bank of our sample. Lerner index has been 
computed in several recent studies on bank competition (e.g. Solis and Maudos, 2008, 
Carbo et al., 2009). The index is defined as the difference between price and marginal 
cost, divided by price. 
The price here is the average price of bank production (proxied by total assets), i.e. 
the ratio of total revenues to total assets, following Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos and 
Perez (2005) and Carbo et al. (2009) among others. The marginal cost is estimated on the 
basis of a translog cost function with one output (total assets) and three input prices (price 
of labor, price of physical capital, and price of borrowed funds). Symmetry and linear 
homogeneity restrictions in input prices are imposed. The cost function is specified as 
follows: 
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where TC denotes total costs, y total assets, w1 the price of labor (ratio of personnel 
expenses to total assets)
2
                                                 
2 As our dataset does not provide numbers of employees, we use this proxy variable for the price of labor, 
following Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007). 
, w2 the price of physical capital (ratio of other non-interest 
expenses to fixed assets), w3 the price of borrowed funds (ratio of interest paid to total 
funding). Total cost is the sum of personnel expenses, other non-interest expenses and 
interest paid. The indices for each bank have been excluded from the presentation for the 
sake of simplicity. The estimated coefficients of the cost function are then used to 
compute the marginal cost (MC):   12 
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Once marginal cost is estimated and price of output computed, we can calculate 





This section presents our results for the impact of market power on the occurrence 
of bank failure. We start with the main estimations and follow with some robustness tests. 
 
V.1 Main estimations 
We perform logit regressions of the occurrence of bank failure on a set of variables 
including market power. The panel  logit model is commonly  used in studies of  the 
occurrence of bank failure (e.g. Arena, 2008) and has been widely adopted in papers 
dealing with bank failures in Russia (Peresetsky, Karminsky and Golovan, 2004; Styrin, 
2005; Lanine and Vander Vennet, 2006; Claeys and Schoors, 2007). 
We use lagged values for all explanatory  variables for two  reasons. First, 
accounting information can be very poor or even missing for failed banks.  Second, 
market power can influence the occurrence of bank failure with a lag. 
We test for several lags in our estimations. Following Lanine and Vander Vennet 
(2006), we include values of explanatory variables for 3, 6, 9 and 12 months before bank 
failure, as we have quarterly data. 
Increasing the number of lags influences the composition of our sample in two 
ways. First, it  reduces the number of observations,  as we need to exclude  certain 
observations at the beginning of our sample. For instance, with 12 months, we drop 
observations for the four quarters of 2001. Second, increasing the number of lags gives us 
a higher number of bank failures (see Table 1), as accounting data for some failed banks 
are not available for the quarters just before the failure. Therefore, by using four quarters 
instead of one, we can include more failed banks in the sample.   13 
Our main  results are displayed in Table 2.  The key finding is the negative 
coefficient of Lerner Index, which is significant at the 1% level. This result is observed 
for all specifications of lagged values, which confirms that it does not depend on the 
number of months before bank failure. Therefore, our main conclusion is that market 
power has a negative influence on the occurrence of bank failure. In other words, our 
findings support the “competition-fragility” view, according to which more competition 
results in more bank failures. This accords with the results obtained at the micro level by 
Jimenez, Lopez and Saurina (2008) and Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009), who 
confirm a positive role of bank competition on risk-taking, and at the macro level by 
Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2006), who find that banking crises are less likely in 
more concentrated banking markets. 
We now turn to the analysis of control variables. We observe a negative sign for 
bank size, which is significant in most specifications. This result is in line with the “too 
big to fail” argument, according to which a big bank has a lower probability of bank 
failure. This was also observed by Claeys and Schoors (2007). 
The ratio of loans to total assets is not significant in all cases. This contrasts with 
what is observed in other regions of the world. Among others, Wheelock and Wilson 
(2000), for the US, and Arena (2008), for East Asian and Latin American countries, find 
a positive impact of this ratio on the probability of bank failure. But our result was also 
obtained by Lanine and Vander Vennet (2006) in their investigation of Russian bank 
failures. This might be explained by the fact that, while in other countries a higher ratio 
of loans to assets is associated  with  excessive risk-taking, the level of financial 
intermediation by banks in Russia is so low (due to less lending) that they are far from 
taking excessive risk when granting more loans. This explanation accords with that of 
Männasoo and Mayes (2009), in their analysis of the determinants of bank distress in 
transition countries. They also obtain a non-significant sign for the loans-to-assets ratio in 
most of their estimations. They claim that lending activity is underdeveloped in transition 
countries and is a marginal part of banks’ activities. Consequently, the exposure to credit 
risk is relatively low in transition countries. 
We find a significantly negative coefficient for the share of deposits to total assets. 
This result can be explained by the depositor discipline which has been observed in   14 
Russia (Ungan, Caner and Özyildirim, 2006; Karas, Pyle and Schoors, 2009). According 
to this argument, depositors adapt their deposits to their perception of the probability of 
bank failure. Consequently, more deposits mean greater confidence of depositors in the 
bank’s health. 
The share of government bonds in total assets is not significant in all the 
estimations. We explain this absence of significance by the existence of counteracting 
influences. On the one hand, a greater value of this variable contributes to the liquidity of 
banks and enhances the government’s incentive to rescue the bank. On the other hand, it 
may also mean greater injury from  government  defaulting  on its securities  in 1998. 
Studies that used this variable to explain the occurrence of bank failures in Russia also 
obtained contradictory results. Lanine and Vander Vennet (2006) obtain a significantly 
negative sign while Claeys and Schoors (2007) find a significantly positive coefficient. 
The differences  in  results  may  derive  from the different periods studied. Indeed the 
negative role of the share of government bonds is linked to the 1998 crisis. Therefore, as 
our analysis is based on the period 2001-2007 while Claeys and Schoors (2007) study an 
earlier period, 1999 to 2002, the detrimental effects of the 1998 crisis are stronger in the 
latter study. 
Finally, we observe that the dummy variable for Moscow location is significantly 
positive, which means that banks located in Moscow have higher probabilities of failure. 
This finding accords with the more frequent bank failures in the Moscow region than in 
other parts of Russia. 
 
V.2 Robustness tests 
We check the robustness of our results in different ways. To keep the testing within 
bounds, we limit the specifications to those with explanatory variables having four lags, 
except for the last case, which focuses on the number of lags. 
First, we use an alternative measure for bank competition in our estimations. 
Following  the wide utilization of concentration indices in  the literature, we take 
indicators of bank concentration as a natural robustness check, even though we are fully 
aware of the limitations of such indices. Bank concentration is measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index for assets (Herfindahl) and by the share of the three largest   15 
banks in total banking assets (Concentration), both computed at the regional level. The 
variability of these measures over time is very modest and so we use the average value of 
each measure during the period under review for each region. As these measures of 
concentration are computed at the regional level, we drop the dummy variable for the 
location in the Moscow  region.  Table  3  displays  the  results  for  these concentration 
indices. We observe a significantly negative coefficient for both indices of concentration, 
meaning that bank concentration reduces the probability of failure. Hence, these results 
corroborate those obtained with the Lerner index. 
Second, we test an alternative definition of bank failure, our dependent variable. 
Our definition is based on the revocation of the banking license and so might be sensitive 
to non-economic motives in some cases. Therefore, in this robustness check the failed 
banks  are those with a ratio of equity to total assets lower than 10 percent. In their 
investigation of the determinants of US bank failures, Wheelock and Wilson (2000) use a 
similar approach by considering two alternative definitions for bank failure. After 
considering only banks that were closed by the FDIC, they extend this definition to banks 
with a ratio of equity less goodwill to total assets of less than two percent. In the case of 
Russian banks, the same value for  this  ratio would not be relevant,  owing to the 
difference in prudential regulation. Regulation forces banks to maintain a bank equity 
capital adequacy ratio higher than 10% and for small banks (capital less than 5 mil. 
euros), the figure is 11%. We display the estimation results for this alternative definition 
of bank failure in table 4. We observe that findings are similar to our main results with a 
negative coefficient for the Lerner index. 
Third, we include the squared Lerner index (Lerner Index²) in the estimations to 
consider possible nonlinearity in the relationship between market power and the 
occurrence of bank failure. Furthermore, this specification helps us  test the claim  of 
Martinez-Meria and Repullo (2008) for the existence of a U-shaped relationship between 
competition and the risk of bank failure. It might indeed happen that this relationship is 
not linear. However, the results  in table  5  confirm  that  neither of the market power 
variables is significant. The lack of significance for Lerner Index is likely to be the result 
of the inclusion of the squared term, owing to their high correlation (0.90). Therefore, we   16 
find no evidence for a nonlinear relationship between market power and the occurrence 
of bank failure. 
Fourth, we check robustness of our results to the choice of control variables. To this 
end, we run our estimations again, dropping one control variable at a time. As table 6 
shows, our results were affected only slightly, either qualitatively or quantitatively. 
Fifth, we try longer time horizons prior to failure (15, 18, 21, 24 months), as the 
effects of bank competition can take more time than we assume in our main estimations.  
These estimations are presented in table 7. We find that the Lerner index remains 
significantly negative in all these specifications as well. 
Our main results have thus survived several robustness tests, leading to findings 





In this paper, we investigate the impact of market power on the occurrence of bank 
failure in Russia. The Russian banking industry provides an example of a very interesting 
emerging market which has experienced a large number of bank failures during the last 
decade.  According to the “competition-fragility” view, we should observe a negative 
relation between market power and competition, as competition increases banks’ 
incentive for risk-taking and reduces the “buffer” against adverse shocks. The 
“competition-stability” view is for a positive relation, owing to the impact of competition 
on borrowers’ moral hazard behavior (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005). 
We find that a higher  degree of market power, measured by the Lerner index, 
reduces the occurrence of failure. Therefore our findings support the “competition-
fragility” view, according to which greater bank competition is detrimental for financial 
stability. In addition, this result is robust to tests controlling for the measurement of 
market power, the definition of bank failure, the set of control variables,  and  the 
nonlinear specification of the relationship.  These results accord  with  the previous 
literature on the relationship between bank- market structure and financial stability (Beck,   17 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine,  2006,  Jimenez, Lopez and Saurina, 2008,  and  Berger, 
Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009). 
The normative implications of our findings are that taking measures that enhance 
bank competition could increase the occurrence of bank failures. We do not claim that 
policies favoring bank competition should be abandoned but rather that they should be 
qualified. Indeed we stress the existence of a tradeoff between the benefits from lower 
banking prices (and notably of loan rates that may contribute to greater investment) and 
the losses from greater number of bank failures due to tighter competition. Our analysis 
can be extended in a number of ways. Additional case studies would provide further 
validation of the findings. 
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This table provides the descriptive statistics for failed and non-failed banks. 
 
 
   FAILED BANKS  NON-FAILED BANKS 
   Mean   St. Dev.  Min  Max  Mean   St. Dev.  Min  Max 
3 months to failure                  
Lerner Index  0.19  0.14  -0.19  0.47  0.21  0.11  -0.28  0.57 
Size  6.79  1.64  3.45  10.71  6.30  1.73  0.10  12.76 
Loans  0.65  0.24  0.06  1.00  0.60  0.19  0.05  1.00 
Government Bonds  0.02  0.04  0  0.14  0.02  0.04  0.00  0.29 
Deposits  0.57  0.23  0.10  0.95  0.64  0.18  0.01  0.98 
Moscow   0.64  0.48  0  1  0.43  0.50  0  1 
N  77  77  77  77  20659  20659  20659  20659 
                 
6 months to failure                 
Lerner Index  0.17  0.16  -0.27  0.56  0.21  0.11  -0.28  0.57 
Size  6.32  1.61  3.05  10.65  6.29  1.72  0.11  12.61 
Loans  0.62  0.24  0.06  1.00  0.60  0.19  0.05  1.00 
Government Bonds  0.01  0.04  0  0.21  0.02  0.04  0  0.29 
Deposits  0.55  0.23  0.10  0.88  0.64  0.18  0.01  0.98 
Moscow   0.66  0.48  0  1  0.43  0.50  0  1 
N  126  126  126  126  19266  19266  19266  19266 
                 
9 months to failure                 
Lerner Index  0.18  0.14  -0.19  0.48  0.21  0.11  -0.28  0.57 
Size  6.22  1.62  1.77  10.65  6.26  1.71  0.15  12.46 
Loans  0.61  0.22  0.06  0.98  0.60  0.19  0.05  1.00 
Government Bonds  0.01  0.03  0  0.18  0.02  0.04  0  0.29 
Deposits  0.56  0.20  0.05  0.88  0.64  0.18  0.01  0.98 
Moscow   0.66  0.47  0  1  0.43  0.50  0  1 
N  139  139  139  139  18198  18198  18198  18198 
                 
12 months to failure                 
Lerner Index  0.20  0.12  -0.24  0.52  0.21  0.11  -0.27  0.57 
Size  6.20  1.64  2.15  10.63  6.23  1.70  0.10  12.37 
Loans  0.60  0.21  0.13  0.99  0.59  0.19  0.05  1.00 
Government Bonds  0.01  0.04  0  0.25  0.02  0.04  0  0.29 
Deposits  0.57  0.20  0.09  0.90  0.64  0.18  0.01  0.98 
Moscow   0.66  0.48  0  1  0.43  0.50  0  1 
N  148  148  148  148  17225  17225  17225  17225 
 
 




Logit estimations are performed under the random effects assumption. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable, bank failure, equal  to  one when a bank’s license was 
revoked and zero otherwise.  Standard errors appear in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% 
or 1% level. Dummy variables for quarters and years are included in the regressions but 
are not reported. 
 
 
   Months prior to bank failure 
   3 months  6 months  9 months  12 months 
Intercept 
-4.311***   -2.735***   -2.035***   -2.620*** 
(-0.950)  (0.808)  (0.710)  (0.708) 
Lerner Index   -2.158**      -3.157***   -3.121***   -1.434** 
(1.018)  (0.732)  (0.713)  (0.725) 
Size  0.023   -0.120*   -0.174***   -0.157*** 
(0.081)  (0.065)  (0.064)  (0.062) 
Loans  0.802  0.149  0.021  -0.158 
(0.655)  (0.487)  (0.465)  (0.452) 
Deposits   -2.404***   -2.296***   -2.009***   -1.734*** 
(0.637)  (0.491)  (0.477)  (0.462) 
Government Bonds  -0.463  -2.169  -4.488  -2.259 
(3.174)  (2.644)  (2.837)  (2.419) 
Moscow 
0.644***  0.913***  1.054***  1.032*** 
(0.266)  (0.211)  (0.207)  (0.199) 
Log likelihood  -469.935  -707.004  -755.514  -801.107 
N  20736  19392  18337  17373 
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Table 3 
Robustness tests, alternative measures of competition 
 
 
Logit estimations are performed under the random effects assumption. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable, bank failure, equals to one when a bank’s license was 
revoked and zero otherwise.  Standard errors appear in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% 
or 1% level. As Herfindahl and Concentration are computed at the regional level, we 
drop the Moscow variable. Dummy variables for quarters and years are included in the 
regressions but are not reported. 
 
 
   With Herfindahl  With Concentration 
Intercept 
 -2.187***  -1.062 
(0.699)  (0.779) 
Herfindahl 
 -2.533***  - 
(0.953)   
Concentration 
-   -2.621*** 
  (0.635) 
Size 
-0.068   -0.115** 
(0.060)  (0.061) 
Loans to assets 
-0.374  -0.228 
(0.450)  (0.453) 
Deposits to assets 
 -2.061***   -1.827*** 
(0.452)  (0.459) 
Government Bonds 
-1.700  -1.793 
(2.423)  (2.419) 
Log likelihood  -812.964  -807.538 
N  17373  17373 
Number of banks  1218  1218 
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Table 4 
Robustness tests, alternative measure of bank failure 
 
Logit estimations are performed under the random effects assumption. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable, bank failure, equal to one when the ratio of equity to assets 
is less than 10 %. Standard errors appear in parentheses below estimated coefficients. *, 
**, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 














Loans to assets 
 -5.838*** 
(0.373) 









Log likelihood  -2748.501 
N  17373 
Number of banks  1218 
 
 
   24 
Table 5 
Robustness tests, allowing for a nonlinear relationship 
 
 
Logit estimations are performed under the random effects assumption. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable, bank failure, equal  to  one when a bank’s license was 
revoked and zero otherwise.  Standard errors appear in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% 
or 1% level. Dummy variables for quarters and years are included in the regressions but 
are not reported. 
 
 













Loans to assets 
-0.165 
(0.453) 









Log likelihood  -801.083 
N  17373 
Number of banks  1218 
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Table 6 
Robustness tests, alternative sets of control variables 
 
 
Logit estimations are performed under the random effects assumption. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable, bank failure, equal  to  one when a bank’s license was 
revoked and zero otherwise. Standard errors appear in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% 
or 1% level. Dummy variables for quarters and years are included in the regressions but 
are not reported. 
 
   -1  -2  -3  -4  -5 
Intercept  -3.254***  -2.713***  -3.692***  -2.621***  -2.360*** 
0.662  0.658  0.664  0.709  0.69 
Lerner Index  -1.157*  -1.440**  -1.345**  -1.387**  -1.435** 
0.721  0.726  0.746  0.72  0.728 
Size  -  -0.162***  -0.219***  -0.168***  -0.03 
0.06  0.06  0.061  0.056 
Loans to assets  -0.456  -  0.203  -0.082  -0.493 
0.434  0.454  0.447  0.448 
Deposits to assets  -2.065***  -1.702***  -  -1.768***  -2.431*** 
0.443  0.454  0.462  0.434 
Government Bonds  -3.475  -2.126  -2.817  -  -1.936 
2.477  2.389  2.441  2.439 
Moscow 
0.843***  1.042***  1.233***  1.026*** 
- 
0.183  0.197  0.192  0.199 
Log likelihood  -804.322  -801.168  -807.831  -801.584  -815.354 
Number of banks  1218  1218  1218  1218  1218 
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Table 7 
Estimations with different lags 
 
Logit estimations are performed under the random effects assumption. The independent 
variable is a dummy variable, bank failure, equal  to  one when a bank’s license was 
revoked and zero otherwise.  Standard errors appear in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% 
or 1% level. Dummy variables for quarters and years are included in the regressions but 
are not reported. 
 
   Months prior to bank failure 
   15 months  18 months  21 months  24 months 
         
Intercept  -1.596*  -2.053***  -1.856***  -2.438*** 
(0.585)  (0.606)  (0.607)  (0.614) 
Lerner Index  -2.823***  -1.593***  -2.077***  -1.589** 
(0.688)  (0.706)  (0.715)  (0.725) 
Size  -0.161*  -0.184***  -0.119*  -0.174*** 
(0.062)  (0.063)  (0.064)  (0.064) 
Loans to assets  -0.310  -0.625  -0.855**  0.295 
(0.448)  (0.451)  (0.466)  (0.482) 
Deposits to assets  -1.611***  -1.069***  -1.632***  -1.579*** 
(0.462)  (0.474)  (0.481)  (0.482) 
Government Bonds  -3.857  -1.896  -2.295  -2.015 
(2.548)  (2.269)  (2.422)  (2.548) 
Moscow   0.972***  1.105***  0.892***  1.087*** 
(0.196)  (0.199)  (0.203)  (0.205) 
Log likelihood  -800.797  -780.943  -728.397  -725.299 
N  16558  15578  14585  13627 
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